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OBSCENITY CONTROL
AND MINORSThe Case for a Separate Standard
EDWARD T. FAGAN*t

Introduction

T

of what is meant by totally
suppressible obscene material' was finally made last June by the
United States Supreme Court. Jacobellis v. Ohio,' coupled with its two
HE LONG ANTICIPATED CLARIFICATION

companion per curiam decisions, Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein3 and

Tralins v. Gerstein,4 limited such material to hard core pornography on
the ground that such material is utterly void of socially redeeming importance.5
While this clarification did not come as much of a surprise, 6 that which
truly confounded the legal world was the totally inexplicable decision
of the New York Court of Appeals a month later in People v. Bookcase,
Inc. 7 In this case the court declared unconstitutional a statute which
provided protection solely to minors against those who sought to distribute obscene material to them for profit. The identical statute, which
had also been enacted in Rhode Island, had been declared constitutional
in 1959 by the Rhode Island high court in State v. Settle."

* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; Editor of The Catholic
Lawyer.
t The author is indebted to the St. Thomas More Institute staff for research assistance in the preparation of this article.
'Fagan, Editorial Comment, 9 CATHOLIc LAW. 267 (1963).
2 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
3378
U.S. 577 (1964).
4 378 U.S. 576 (1964).
5What however is hard core pornography? Mr. Justice Stewart admits, in his
concurring opinion, that he cannot define it but he knows it when he sees it.
Supra note 2, at 197.
6 See Regan, Freedom of the Mind and Justice Brennan, 9 CATHOLIC LAW. 269,

276 (1963).
7 14 N.Y.2d 409, 201 N.E.2d 14, 252 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964).
8 90 R.I. 195, 156 A.2d 921 (1959).
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The Rhode Island case had also been
cited with approval by Mr. Justice Brennan in his opinion in the Jacobellis case 9
as an example of proper remedial legislation governing sales of obscene material to
minors.
The net result of these recent cases has
been to leave the children of New York
State almost completely vulnerable to the
poison dispensed by those who traffic in
obscenity for profit.1" It is imperative,
therefore, that all responsible members of
the community take immediate action to
re-establish appropriate legal safeguards
for children against this danger. Lawyers,
of necessity, must be the leaders in such
remedial activity.
It is obvious to all students of law and
to others who are interested in the particular aspect of law dealing with censorship
that governmental regulation of obscenity
has already been exhaustively analysed and
discussed by a myriad of experts and
jurists.11 Numerous arguments have been
advanced in the past by the "Philistines"
who advocate variable standards as the
basis for determining suppressible ob-

scenity on the adult level or who support
the extension of the definition of legal obscenity to include all materials which might
remotely smack of the licentious or the indecent. The "Libertarians" have been
equally emphatic in their denunciations of
any curbs whatsoever on the freedom of
artistic expression. In effect, a torrent of
writing has already been loosed-official,
legal, psychological and lay.
For all practical purposes, further discussion and disputation in this area seems
at first blush to have become academic. We
now know that hard core pornography is
all that can be removed from the adult
book market. However, what has not been
satisfactorily established to date is the exact nature of obscene material which, in
addition to hard core pornography, can
legally be barred from sale to minors. Too
many people are prone to conclude that
only hard core pornography can be withheld from both child and adult as a result
of present Supreme Court and state court
pronouncements. This conclusion is unwarranted.
Scope of Article

. Supra note 2, at 195 n.l 1.
10 New York is not alone in this predicament.
Other states in a similar situation are California
and Maryland.
11 Without endeavoring to furnish a complete
bibliography, the following are suggested in their
respective fields. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1960) (a general
survey of the problem-a complete collection
of materials). Lockhart & McClure, Literature,

The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38
MINN. L. REV. 295 (1954); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity; The Developing
Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5
(1960) (a complete survey of the law to mid1960); Hayes, The Law of Obscenity, 8 CATHOLIC LAW. 93 (1962); ST. JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW (1956).

The aim of this article, therefore, is twofold. First, it shall delineate the separate
classification, in law, of minors as a prospective audience for obscenity. This distinction has been uniformly recognized and
accepted throughout the evolution of obscenity law and continues to exist to the
present time. Recognition of such separate
status becomes meaningful only if it further
extends to the acceptance of a separate
standard for the determination of what
constitutes suppressible obscene material
with respect to such minors. That such a
separate standard exists is apparent from
case law analysis.

10
Secondly, it will endeavor to provide
suggestions and caveats for the formulation
of this separate standard to draftsmen who
may presently be working on remedial obscenity legislation. It will also explore possible collateral aids to implement the enforcement of such a separate standard,
once statutorily defined.
Separate Minor Classification
a) Public Morality
In regard to youth it has always been
assumed in law that the government has a
special responsibility and authority. According to the Supreme Court:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity
as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and
12
dangers within a broad range of selection.
Is it equally true that the law has always upheld the authority of government
to prohibit that which offends public morality precisely because of its immoral character?" It is particularly important to note
here that while the police power is the
means by which the state acts to protect
public morality it normally will not be exercised if in such exercise the state interferes with freedoms guaranteed under the
first amendment. In the case of Prince v.
Massachusetts,'4 it was established that in
the realm of religious freedom the state has
the right to restrict the child if such restriction is deemed necessary to protect the
12Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168

(1943).
Whelan, Censorship and the Constitutional
Concept of Morality, 53 GEO. L.J. 547 (1955).
'3
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child. (Although if such action were directed against an adult it would be clearly
unconstitutional as an abridgement of his
first amendment freedom.) Obviously, if
religious freedom can be restricted, so also
can freedom of speech be restricted in a
child for his protection. It follows, therefore, that if the state determines that a
restriction of a child's freedom, in the area
of reading or scrutinizing certain materials,
is necessary for his protection the exercise
of police power should be justified in restraining the child from examining such
materials. As a corollary to such child restraint, it follows further that adults may be
restrained from selling such material to
children even though such restraint limits
to some extent the guarantee of free speech
and free press which the adult may otherwise claim.
A unanimous Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Swayne, has said:
The foundation of a republic is the virtue
of its citizens. They are at once sovereigns
and subjects. As the foundation is undermined, the structure is weakened. When it
is destroyed the fabric must fall. Such is
the voice of history.' 5
With respect to the question of who is to
determine what is violative of public morality, the Supreme Court has said:
Under our system that power is lodged in
the legislative branch of the government.
It belongs to that department to exert what
are known as police powers of the State,
and to determine, primarily, what measures
are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health,
or the public safety.' 6
In this connection an important considera-

For a discussion of the differences between law
and morality see ST. JOHN-STEVAs,
AND THE LAW (1961).
14

321 U.S. 158 (1943).

LIFE, DEATH

"5Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441, 450
(1874).
16 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660 (1887).
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tion in dealing with legislation restrictive of
free speech is the division of responsibility
between the legislature and the court in
determining whether a certain type of expression produces evil results. 17 It is not
the function of the court to debate the wisdom of a legislative determination that obscene material can cause a moral deterioration in the young and a resultant tendency toward juvenile delinquency. In an
area where the psychological experts are
so divided, the policy decision is the legislature's, not the courts'. This is not to say
that the courts cannot, in a due-process
case, find that the legislative inferences
from available data are so unreasonable
and arbitrary as to be invalid. It is submitted that the courts' share of the responsibility is to accept the legislative judgment
of the causal relationship between obscene
material and societal evil as valid if not unreasonable-not to accept it as valid only
if convinced it is sound.
The concern of the various communities
throughout this country and, in fact
throughout the world with respect to obscenity has been long established."" These
communities, after exhaustive analysis of
the pros and cons as to the deleterious
effect of obscene material, have determined
See Richardson, Freedom of Expression and
the Function of Courts, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1

that obscenity corrupts morals and character and should be eliminated. 19 This opinion is particularly evident with respect to
children. Since the communities have
strongly indicated their position concerning the adverse effect of obscenity on the
character and morality of children, it follows that the legislature is obligated to
take all necessary and proper legal steps
consistent with constitutional guarantees of
freedom of expression to support the right
of parents to deal with the morals of their
children as they see fit.
Professor Louis Henkin, in a recent article, admits that protection of the morals
of children requires separate obscenity legislation for minors,'2 although he has recently challenged the conclusion that obscenity is a proper object of legislative social regulation under the aegis of public
morality where adults are concerned. 21 He
questions whether in the balance of freedom and authority under the scrutiny of
the Constitution the public's interest in
suppressing obscenity outweighs the exponent's freedom of expression.
According to Professor Henkin, changing values may have dissipated notions
once deemed fundamental to morality, and
countervailing values of freedom, growing

17

(1951).
1 This concern has been noted by Mr. Justice

Brennan in Roth where he stated that:
But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance. This rejection for that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity should be re-

strained, reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws
of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity
laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to
1956. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957).

19 Such community studies in obscenity may be
best illustrated by the reports of the New York
State Legislative Committee. They contain,
inter alia, exhibits of material deemed objectionable, expert testimony on what is obscene, proposed statutes, recently enacted laws, and New

York court cases. The committee has published
the following studies: Legislative Document Nos.
15 (1951), 64 (1952), 37 (1954), 37 (1955), 32

(1956), 83 (1957), 85 (1958), 83 (1960), 77
(1962), and 81 (1963).
20 Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin
of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391, 413
(1963).
211d. at 406.
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in potency, may now outweigh moral
values on the constitutional scale.
Narrowing in on his argument, he posits
that abhorrence of obscenity has its roots
in religion and its suppression achieves no
other apparent result than a support of religious belief. Absent any utilitarian social
basis for obscenity control, he concludes
that it may well be deemed an unreasonable interference by government in the area
of private morality. His viewpoint has
since been adopted by at least one other
22
expert.
In reply to Professor Henkin one need
merely point out that hard core pornography is all that may be banned from the
adult today. If his argument is made as
a defense of the pornographer then the answer is obvious-hard core pornography is
utterly without any redeeming social importance. The repugnance and disgust
which arises naturally upon exposure to
hard core pornography is based not upon
religious teaching and tradition but upon
an instinctive rejection of corruption and
decay. That which is filthy and disgusting
cannot be amusing. Restraints upon pornographers have the utilitarian value of releasing presses for material that may at
least produce some slight social benefit,
if only adult level amusement. The production and commercial exploitation of hard
core pornography is in the public domain
and distinguishable from activity such as
private blasphemy or private sacrilege
which may be contrary to public morality
but still may not be properly subject to
legal restraint.
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b) Clear and PresentDanger
Another approach through case law can
be taken in an attempt to establish the
separate classification of minors in obscenity control, in addition to the public
morality, police power justification.
The principal cases raising the issue of
freedom of communication in recent years
have involved "speech" found to be part
of a pattern of subversive action believed
to endanger the safety of the nation. If
such speech creates a clear and present
danger of any undesirable consequence at
which the state may aim, it may be suppressed. Adopting the language of Chief
Judge Learned Hand, the Supreme Court
has said:
In each case [courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the "evil", discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger
....
We adopt this statement of the rule.
As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it
is as succinct and inclusive as any other we
might devise at this time. It takes into
consideration those factors which we deem
relevant, and relates their significances.
23
More we cannot expect from words.
It has been argued that no responsible
court, in modern times, has held or asserted that an obscene item is dangerous
because it might incite the reader or viewer
to perform a criminal act. 24 Hence, if the
application of the clear-and-present-danger
rule is interpreted as being limited to that
which incites to violence or crime, a causal
relationship cannot be established between
obscenity and violence; hence, the rule is
not applicable. This seems to be the view

22 Gerber, A Suggested Solution To The Riddle
of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 834, 851

23

(1964).

24 Gerber, supra note 22, at 851.

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510

(1951).
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of Mr. Justice Black and others who have
25

supported him.

Although it is true that one item of obscenity may be deemed insignificant in itself, the torrential flood of obscenity which
is saturating today's young may well be an
inducement to perversion and juvenile delinquency.2 ,The problem is how to prove it.
With respect to this condition, the Supreme Court of the United States, which
may well be called a responsible court, has
stated as recently as 1948 that "we recognize the importance of the exercise of a
state's police power to minimize all incentives to crime, particularly in the field
of sanguinary or salacious publications
with their stimulation of juvenile delinquency.

can Law Institute which quoted from the
report in support of its obscenity definition
in its 1957 draft of the Model Penal
Code. 29 This definition was the basis for

the present Supreme Court definition of
obscenity as set forth in Roth v. United
States.2
The report, which was prepared by Dr.
Marie Jahoda, was summarized by her, in
part, as follows:
1. (In regard to the assumption that reading about prurient sex or violence or
crime leads to anti-social actions, especially juvenile delinquency) there exists
no research evidence either to prove or

disprove this assumption definitely.
2. Experts on juvenile delinquency agree
there is no single cause.
3. With regard to the impact of literature
on the mind of the reader . . . there is
a vast overlap in content between all
media of mass communications. . . . It
is virtually impossible to isolate the impact of one of these media on a population exposed to all of them.
It is likely . . . that excessive reading of
comic books will intensify in children
those qualities which drove them to the
comic book world to begin with ...
It should be noted that insofar as causal
sequence is implied, insecurity and maladjustment in a child must precede this
exposure to the written word in order
to lead to those potential effects. Unfortunately, perhaps the reading of
Shakespeare's tragedies or of Anderson's and Grimm's fairy tales do much
the same harm."'

27

The argument against any significant
causal relationship between juvenile delinquency and obscene material can be
traced to a report which originally was
cited in the concurring opinion of Judge
Frank in United States v. Roth.2 8

It was

given still wider publicity by the Ameri-

To those who take this view, what is meant
by "incitement" and what constitutes "incitement" would presumably present the same questions of degree and the same inquiries into scienter, purpose and gravity which the Court considered in the Dennis case.
26 "Obscenity, pornography, salacious literature
-whatever you may call it-is a two billion
dollar a year racket in the United States .... It
is shocking when we realize that 75%-90% of
the materials peddled by these perverted profiteers
fall into the hands of unwary young people."
Address by Francis Cardinal Spellman, Grand
Aerie Convention Banquet, Denver Hilton Hotel, August 6, 1964.
27Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 503, 510
(1947).
2s237 F.2d 796, 815 (2d Cir. 1956), afl'd, 354
U.S. 476 (1957).
25

Since 1957, many additional investigations have been made in the area of research as to the causes of juvenile delinquency. Some of what has been produced
§ 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
U.S. 476 (1957).
31 Supra note 29.
29

30 354
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has contradicted the Jahoda report conclusions. The report was admittedly based
upon lack of research evidence, and confined strictly to the relationship between
crime comics and juvenile delinquency.
The Committee on Public Health of the
New York Academy of Medicine in 1963
strongly recommended "legislation designed to make salacious literature unavailable to minors by prohibiting sale of
it to them," after the Committee concluded:
Although some adolescents may not be affected by the reading of salacious literature, others may be more vulnerable. Such
reading . . . interferes with the development of a healthy attitude and respect for
the opposite sex....
Behavior is complex. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to prove scientifically that a
direct causal relation exists between libidinous literature and socially unaccepted conduct. Yet, it is undeniable that there has
been a resurgence of venereal disease, particularly among teen-age youth, and that
the rate of illegitimacy is climbing. . . .It
can be asserted ... that the perusal of erotic
literature has the potentiality of inciting
some young persons to enter into illicit sex
relations and thus leading them into prom32
iscuity, illegitimacy and venereal disease.
Another cautious commentator, after
concluding from a review of the available
empirical data that "a significant portion
of our society is sexually aroused to some
extent by some form of sex stimuli in pictures and probably in books," has considered reasonable the proposition that the
portrayal of nudity or sexual activity detrimentally affects the formation of attitudes,
particularly among the young: "Where no
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strong sexual attitudes exist a priori, either
because of a person's youth or his sexual
naivete, one would expect that the exposure to sexual stimuli would have its strongest effect."' 33
Moreover, there is evidence of psychological harm to young persons from the
material at issue. In one view, "such
reading encourages a morbid preoccupation with sex. . . . It is said to contribute
to perversion. In the opinion of some psychiatrists, it may have an especially detrimental effect on disturbed adolescents. 34
Others have concluded from studies of
"persons who reflect considerable sexual
guilt and sexual identification problems"
that "the presentation of sexual materials,
for some persons, is an aversive or disruptive experience. 33 Although psychiatrists disagree as to the particular effects of
this material, there appears to be a consensus that the danger of emotional harm is
greatest for the young. 30
Another study, reported by Dr. Fredric
Wertham in 1954, is notable for its thoroughness and objectivity in the examination of psychological aberrations in children caused by exposure to deleterious
material. 37 The psychiatric patients, for the
most part children, could only have as-

33Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The
Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the
Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009,
1032, 1035, 1039 (1962).
34 Supra note 32.
35 Supra note 32, at 1036.
36 PAUL & SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL (1961).
37 WERTHAM,

VI (1954).
32 Statement By The

New York Academy of

Medicine Prepared by the Committee on Public
Health, 39 BULL. OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF MED.
545-46 (1963).
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MORAL CONDUCT

AND
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EXPERIENCE 23 n.4 (1945); St. John-Stevas,
Obscenity, Literature and the Law, 3 CATHOLIC
LAW. 303, 306 (1957).
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sumed their familiarity with obscene matters from the books and magazines which
they had read. These children could not
have brought to their reading any pre-existing obscenity: the literature which they
read caused the perversions from which
they suffered. The process is something
like the following: (1) some objective
stimulus-the obscene book or magazine;
(2) a mental reaction and then an emotional one; (3) "a physical and physiological expression, glandular or muscular,
of the mental and emotional state." The
result of this process is some promiscuous
sexual activity which is prompted by the
reading material. Obscenity, therefore, does
exist in the novel or magazine and is the
occasion as well as the proximate cause of
moral harm in the individual who is reading.
Dr. Jahoda's view is also in direct opposition to that of psychologists such as
Dr. George W. Henry, Professor of Clinical Psychology at Cornell University. Dr.
Henry has affirmed that children can "be
sexually perverted by looking at, by studying, and by dwelling upon the photos of
this nature and content. . . ." In his opinion, "a large proportion of the population"
is susceptible to the evil influences of obscene publications. 8 In a similar vein Dr.
Benjamin Karpman, Chief Psychotherapist
at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington,
D.C., has testified in regard to the effects
of obscenity that "you can take a perfectly healthy boy or girl and by exposing
them to abnormalities you can virtually
crystallize and settle their habits for the

rest of their lives." He found that "there is
a direct relationship between juvenile delinquency, sex life, and pornographic literature." 19
Restating the argument which may be
made against those who still insist on more
empirical evidence before a causal relationship can be established between juvenile
delinquency and the reading or viewing of
obscene material, it appears that there is
abundant psychological clinical evidence
today of a correlation between the constant
exposure to obscene material and criminal
action. In reaching this conclusion psychology uses the tools proper to its field
and understands the law of causality in a
way that recognizes the peculiar characteristics of the human personality and that
has proved not only realistic but productive of beneficial results in mental health
40
and conduct.
Even if a particular court would still insist that a causal relation has not been
scientifically established through such psychological studies, one can cite J. Edgar
Hoover's statement that "we cannot afford
to wait for an answer from psychiatrists as
to the extent that it [obscene material]
affects the youth's mind. We do know that
' 41
sex crime is associated with pornography."
With respect then to the approach to the
separate standard through the clear-andpresent-danger test, it can best be summed
up by saying that the scope of the test
is not clear today with respect to obscenity
control. The gravity of the danger required
for the disturbance of various types of

39 Id. at 12.

3 Testimony before the U.S. Congress,

40 MURPHY, CENSORSHIP:

SUBCOMMITTEE TO
LINQUENCY, Rep.

SCENITY ch.

INVESTIGATE

No. 2381,

Sess. 10, 11 (1956).

SENATE
JUVENILE DE-

84th Cong., 2d

41

GOVERNMENT AND OB-

9 (1963).
Letter From J. Edgar Hoover to All Law En-

forcement Officials, January 1, 1960.
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speech and press is so great that it is difficult to determine to what extent the doctrine is still viable in areas other than subversive speech. Its employment, therefore,
as a sole justification for a separate standard for minors in the area of obscenity
control is unwise. In the words of Paul A.
Freund, "no matter how rapidly we utter
the phrase 'clear and present danger' or
how closely we hyphenate the words, they
are not a substitute for the weighing of
values." 4"
The existence of the separate standard is
best established through a state's right to
limit the first amendment freedoms of children in protection of public morality. The
evidence of causal relationship between
constant exposure of children to obscer.e
materials and moral degeneracy and juvenile delinquency, even though conflicting,
can certainly justify a legislative decision
to act in this area despite the fact that it
results in some curtailment of adult freedom of press.
The Separate Standard
Recognizing, therefore, that minors have
a separate status in law with respect to
the sale to them of obscene material, is the
separate status one which will be recognized merely in the procedural area or
will it affect the substantive law as well?
In other words, will hard core pornography be defined as the sole standard for
the suppression of obscenity in sales to
minors, with perhaps the requirement of
scienter modified as to such sales, or will
that which is deemed suppressible obscenity be defined as more than hard core pornography coupled with a scienter require42 FREUND,
COURT

ON

UNDERSTANDING

27-28 (1950).

THE

SUPREME
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ment modification where sales to minors
are involved?
Underlying any discussion as to the
mode in which the legislature can act with
respect to the dissemination of obscene
materials to minors is the case of Butler v.
Michigan.4 3 The Supreme Court, in this

case, invalidated as arbitrary a Michigan
statute prohibiting the sale to anyone of
any material which would tend to have a
deleterious influence upon youth. Counsel
for the State of Michigan insisted that the
statute was enacted to protect the children
within Michigan from the possible effect
that might result from seeing the type of
material that was prohibited. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the undivided
Court, however, stated that the legislation
did not reasonably restrict the evil with
which it was said to deal. Although the
Court had the opportunity to hold that a
state could not separately legislate in the
area of obscenity with regard to children,
it did not choose to so rule. Instead, it
approvingly made reference to another
Michigan statute which was specifically designed to protect minors by prohibiting the
sale to them of material which would tend
to corrupt their morals. From this unanimous Supreme Court decision it can be
inferred that legislation restricting the sale
of certain materials to minors, which material would be judged by a child's standards, would be constitutional.
Indeed, as recently as 1960, a federal
court stated by way of dictum:
Neither our ruling here nor anything we
have said should be construed as precluding an effective state policy of safeguarding minors against publications which,
though not obscene when judged by the
standards of the community as a whole,
may, nevertheless, be thought to have a
43 352

U.S. 380 (1957).
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corrupting influence on the morals of
youth. While we have no occasion here to
pass on the constitutionality of such a law,
it would seem that a state might enact a
valid statute "specifically designed to protect its children" from suggestive books and
magazines that are not too rugged for
grown men and women, without at the
same time burning the house down to
roast the pig by restricting everyone else
to reading such fiction as Boy's Life at the
magazine stand and The Five Little Pep44
pers at the bookstand.

We are told that only "hard core pornography" should be denied the protection of
the First Amendment. But who can define
"hard core pornography" with any greater
clarity than "obscenity"? And even if we
were to retreat to that position, we would
soon be faced with the need to define that
term just as we now are faced with the
need to define "obscenity." Meanwhile,
those who profit from the commercial exploitation of obscenity would continue to
ply their trade unmolested.
In my opinion, the use to which various
materials are put-not just the words and
pictures themselves-must be considered in
determining whether or not the materials
are obscene. A technical or legal treatise
on pornography may well be inoffensive
under most circumstances but at the same
time, "obscene" in the extreme when sold
46
or displayed to children.

Further justification for this inference
can be found in the statement of Mr.
Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice
Goldberg, in the Jacobellis case wherein it
was said, citing the Settle case as an example:
We recognize the legitimate and indeed
exigent interest of the States and localities
throughout the Nation in preventing the
dissemination of material deemed harmful
to children. But that interest does not justify a total suppression of such material,
the effect of which would be to "reduce the
adult population . . . to reading only what
is fit for children." State and local authorities might well consider whether their objectives in this area would be better served
by laws aimed specifically at preventing
distribution of objectionable material to
children, rather than at totally prohibiting
its dissemination. Since the present conviction is based upon exhibition of the film
to the public at large and not upon its exhibition to children, the judgment must be
reviewed under the strict standard applicable in determining the scope of the expression that is protected by the Constitu45
tion.
Mr. Justice Warren, joined by Mr. Justice Clark, expressed a similar view in a
dissent:
In re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241,
247 (E.D. La. 1960).
45 Supra note 2, at 195.
44

The Formulation of a Separate Standard
Once
standard
must be
children

it is accepted that a separate
for children is constitutional, it
appreciated that laws to protect
against obscenity present prob-

lems of delineating standards and especially of definiteness and precision if attempts are made to define the kinds of
material that are forbidden on the ground

that they are deleterious to a child. A
general description which bars material
that "for a minor is obscene when it is
presented in a salacious manner" may well
be deemed sufficient to make for a constitutionally acceptable statute in itself
when it is directed solely at barring sales

to minors.
It is submitted that such general terminology should be deemed constitutionally
acceptable as "permissibly uncertain"
against the objection of vagueness and indefiniteness just as it has been in the
46

Supra note 2, at 201.
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stated as a preamble to such a separate
statute it should require of the courts the
adoption of more rigid standards in the
scrutiny of alleged obscene matter when
viewed in its potential effect on minors
Again, it should

be emphasized that it is not the function
of the courts to question the wisdom of
legislative determination.
The practical result, nevertheless, will
be that many courts may be reluctant to
venture much beyond hard core pornography in suppressing material under such
a general statute unless the legislature
goes further and carefully and accurately
describes the material forbidden to youth.
This reluctance, however, may be overcome by the employment of expert testimony in each individual case on the question of whether the particular material is
deleterious to minors, if the court considers
49
such aid necessary.
Such legislation will certainly meet with
strong opposition as will any other type
of legislation in this field, however it is
worded. According to Professors Lockhart
and McClure:
To prohibit dealers from exhibiting within
the view of adolescents books and magazines that can be sold only to adults would
raise the additional problem of undue interference with the material's primary audience. Beyond these obstacles is the disrupting effect of "adult only" counters or
shelves in book stores and newsstands, for
4 Winters v. New York,

333 U.S. 503, 518
(1947).
48 People v. Finkelstein, 156 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Magis.
Ct. 1955).
4 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 99 (1960).
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the "adult only" label would serve only to
attract adolescents eager for a look at the
forbidden fruit and would make it difficult
for the dealer to prevent adolescent shoplifting of the books and magazines. To
avoid these difficulties cautious dealers
might well decide to abandon all books and
magazines claimed by anyone to be unsuitable for adolescents. 50

obscenity cases involving the general public.4 7 If the legislative intent is clearly

rather than on adults. 4
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Balancing the interests between the
rights of parents and minors to obtain
protection against material which adversely
affects youth and the economic loss which
might possibly result to booksellers if obscene material is banned from minors, it
seems clear that courts will resolve any
conflict in favor of the parents and minors
since the danger to these persons is much
greater than the possible monetary loss to
booksellers which the avoidance of such
danger may occasion.
A reading of the majority opinion of the
New York Court of Appeals in the Bookcase decision will support this conclusion.
Judge Van Voorhis very carefully established that the issue before the court was
not whether the material was obscene under a separate standard for minors, but
"whether the legislature can constitutionally restrict, the sale . . . of material to
minors . . . for the reason that it is prin-

cipally devoted to the subject of illicit sex
or sexual immorality." The opinion intimates clearly that if the particular clause
objected to was deleted from the statute,
the material under consideration might
well have been deemed obscene with respect to minors and, therefore, sales to
them made suppressible. In the words of
the court:
It is noteworthy that the 1954 Report to
the legislature of the Committee on whose
50

Id. at 86.
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recommendation the present Section 484-h
of the Penal Law was originally adopted,
recommended an addition to the obscenity
statute proposed to be known as Section
1141-b, which would have forbidden the
commercial distribution to minors of material "which, for a minor, is obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting
.... "Such a recognition that printed material or pictures may be classified as obscene for minors which would not be so for
adults would have been in accord with
statutes adopted in a number of other
jurisdictions. .

.

. Appellants, it may be re-

peated, have not been convicted of selling
an obscene book to a minor, but one which
is principally devoted to descriptions of illicit sex or sexual immorality, unrelated to
whether the book is obscene. The People
concede that no issue of obscenity is before
the Court on this appeal. 51
Legislative Suggestions
While it is true that the New York
Court of Appeals has in effect pronounced
in advance that it will declare constitutional
a statute which suppresses sales to minors
of material "which is obscene to a minor
when presented in a salacious manner," the
effectiveness of such statute is highly questionable on a law enforcement level. Our
law enforcement officers, as is pointed out
elsewhere in this issue, 52 need definitive
guides to assist them in determining against
what materials they should proceed. Again,
unless the legislature carefully spells out
what type of materials it has determined
are deleterious to minors, a court will have
no recourse other than to usurp the legislative prerogative on this point.
The main obstacle which the draftsman
faces when he undertakes to draft a statute
which itemizes such material in a series of
51 Supra note 7, at 416, 201 N.E.2d at 18, 252
N.Y.S.2d at 438-39.
Sullivan, Obscenity: Police Enforcement Problems, infra at 301.

specific descriptions is the fact that in
order to avoid a "vagueness and indefinite"
objection he must be so specific that his
resultant description will be so unduly narrow that it will exclude much of the material he would wish to include.
A great deal of the difficulty in this area
stems from Winters v. New York.5 3 In
this case the Supreme Court of the United
States considered the constitutionality of
a New York statute which made it a
criminal offense to publish or distribute
publications "principally made up of criminal news, police reports or accounts of
criminal deeds or pictures or stories of
deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime." The
statute had been previously interpreted by
the New York Court of Appeals to be
aimed at publications in which collections
of accounts of criminal deeds of bloodshed
or lust are so massed as to render them
vehicles for inciting violence and depraved
crimes against the person. Six members of
the Supreme Court held, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Reed, that even as so interpreted by the court of appeals the statute
did not set up a sufficiently definite standard of conduct:
When a legislative body concludes that the
mores of the community call for an extension of the impermissible limits, an enactment aimed at the evil is plainly within
its power, if it does not transgress the boundaries fixed by the Constitution for freedom of expression. The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is
higher than in those depending primarily
upon civil sanction for enforcement. The
crime "must be defined with appropriate
definiteness."
We think fair use of collections of pictures
and stories would be interdicted because of
the utter impossibility of the actor or the

52

53 Supra note 27.

10
trier to know where this new standard of
guilt would draw the line between the allowable and the forbidden publications. No

intent or purpose is required-no indecency or obscenity in any sense heretofore known to the law. "So massed as to
incite to crime" can become meaningful
54
only by concrete instances.
While the Supreme Court did not explicitly outlaw all restraints on material
dealing with violence in itself, it would
seem that the almost inevitable conclusion
one may draw from the Winters case is
that it is impossible today to draft a statute
which would validly ban the "pornography
of violence." It may be wise, therefore, to
leave this aspect of obscenity outside the
area of legal controls and depend upon
community action for its suppression from
children.
A statute which attempts to define what
is obscene to a minor should be preceded
by a clear statement of legislative intent
as to why such separate obscenity legislation is deemed necessary. The statute
should then declare in general terms that
"sales to minors of material which to a
minor is obscene when presented in a
salacious manner" are prohibited. The
statute should then proceed, in separate
sections, to itemize specifically by description certain material which falls within the
general exclusion clause. It should be
clearly spelled out that such enumeration
is employed only to illustrate and not to
limit the applicability of the statute solely
to the specifically described examples. A
severability clause should be made part
of such statute to preserve it in the event
that any of the separate itemizations are
later interpreted as vague and unenforceable. The number of descriptions which
54,

4t 515, 519.
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such statute may contain is dependent
completely upon the expertise of the
draftsman and his ability to express exactly
the limits of the proscribed material.
An example of such description is the
following:
"Pictures of nude or partially denuded
figures, posed or presented in a manner to
provoke or arouse lust or passion or to
exploit sex, lust or perversion. ' 5 5 Beyond
this rather obvious depiction, the task becomes extremely difficult and the way
fraught with peril. This is not to say however that it cannot be done. How well it
can be done will depend upon the astuteness of the lawyers involved and the facil56
ity of the draftsman's quill.
Collateral Aids
Advisory Committee
No matter how specific a statute is
drawn which restricts the sale of obscene
material to minors, law enforcement officials will find great difficulty in predetermining the material which falls within the
statute in advance of a court determination.
As an aid to officials in this area it is suggested that a permanent advisory committee be established by the state or municipality, to be staffed by qualified legal,
psychological and sociological experts in
the field of obscenity control. This committee would function primarily as an advisory board to law enforcement officials,
indicating to them what, in its opinion,
would be adult-level material in the current
55N.Y. PEN. LAW § 484-h. But see People v.
Kaplan, -

Misc.2d -, 252 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y.C.

Crim. Ct. 1964), which ruled this clause void for
vagueness.
56 See For Adults Only: The Constitutionality of
Governmental Film Censorship by Age Classi-

fication, 69 YALE L.J. 141 (1959).
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book market. Membership on such committee would serve also to establish the
members, in part, as qualified experts in
any later court action on the issue of obscenity in a particular publication under
prosecution. The activity of such committee would be of immeasurable aid to those
faced with the problems of operating under
any obscenity control statute, regardless
of how clearly it is worded.
Unfortunately, such committee might
well be attacked as an illegal prior restraint since its determination of obscenity
would be made in advance of any hearing
on the question. It should be noted, however, that although any prior restraint by
its very nature is offensive to constitutional
principles, its use is not per se prohibited.
The Supreme Court has, in many instances, considered the constitutionality of
censorship statutes, especially those statutes
relating to obscene materials. Although the
Court in each of these cases held the particular provisions of the statutes in question to be unconstitutional, it has never
said that prior restraint itself was unconstitutional. It has very carefully avoided
this issue. By implication it is clear that
given a justified reason for such legislation,
coupled with adequate constitutional safeguards, such legislation would probably
be held not to violate constitutional safeguards.
Support for the above statements is derived from the Supreme Court case of Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan.57 Involved in
this case was the constitutionality of a
Commission, created by the Rhode Island
Legislature, whose purpose was to educate
the public as to what materials were obscene, to investigate and recommend the
57 372 U.S.

58 (1963).

prosecution of violators of the obscenity
statutes, to combat juvenile delinquency
and to encourage morality in youth. The
Court, however, did not hold the legislation creating the Commission to be unconstitutional, but held that certain acts
of the Commission were unconstitutional,
i.e., the intimidation of booksellers. Mr.
Justice Clark, who concurred in the result,
indicated that he felt that even in light of
this decision the Rhode Island Commission
would still be free to publicize its feelings,
to solicit and support the public in preventing dissemination of deleterious material to minors, to furnish its findings to
publishers, distributors, retailers and law
enforcement officials and to seek the aid of
such law enforcement officials in prosecuting offenders.
In drafting a prior restraint statute, it
would be necessary to incorporate several
other provisions not utilized in the Rhode
Island Resolution in order to have a more
effective statute and to have procedural
safeguards. There must be a provision for
an appeal from the committee's determination. This is necessary to satisfy the requirement of judicial supervision espoused
by Mr. Justice Brennan in the Bantam
Books case.
In order to strengthen the statute there
should be incorporated some form of notification to be put on the book or magazine
by the wholesaler or retailer that the Commission has found the book to be objectionable to children. This would not prevent a parent from buying the so labeled
book for his or her child to read if the
parent so desired. The retailer could also
disregard the Commission's recommendation and await a summons and then litigate
the obscenity issue or could proceed by
way of injunction against the Commission

10

as to the particular book and thus have the
question of obscenity decided by the court.
Although the problem created by using
the "adults only" notification-notoriety of
the book so labeled-is recognized, the
general benefit of the statute to the community would far outweigh this shortcoming.
Tie-In Statutes
Another problem which arises out of
separate statutes directed at restricting obscene materials from minors is that of effective prosecution. On the adult level,
prosecutions are very effective when law
enforcement officials utilize injunctive relief and sequester all the allegedly obscene
material pending a court determination.
This removes the book from the market
immediately and effectively ties the hands
of the bookseller until the outcome of the
suit.
When prosecuting under a minor statute,
however, sequestration of the material is
not an available remedy since the material
is still saleable to adults and such sales
cannot be proscribed.
As a partial solution to this problem it
is suggested that communities enact a "tiein sale" statute similar to the following
New York State statute, but re-enacted to
be applicable to that which is obscene to
minors:
Distribution of indecent articles; tie-in sales.
-No person, co-partnership or corporation shall as a condition to a sale, allocation, consignment or delivery for resale of
any paper, magazine, book, periodical or
publication require that the purchaser or
consignee receive for resale any other article, book or other publication reasonably
believed by the purchaser or consignee to
be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting nor shall any person,
co-partnership or corporation, deny or
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threaten to deny any franchise or impose
or threaten to impose any penalty, financial
or otherwise, by reason of the failure of
any person to accept such articles, books,
or publications, or by reason of the return
thereof.
A violation of this section shall be a mis-

demeanor.58

With such a statute on the books, a
community can approach a bookseller who
is attempting to cooperate with community activity in obscenity control and compel removal of a great deal of material
from the magazine racks and bookshelves
in one action. Again, however, the cooperation of the bookseller is necessary to
make such legislation effective.
Conclusion
It is undeniably true that, while a constitutionally acceptable statute can be
drafted for the restriction of material from
minors, which to a minor is obscene, the
law is a clumsy instrument to use as a sole
solution to this problem. Good law is necessarily minimal in order to allow maximum freedom and individual differences
and in order to be based on generally held
convictions.5 Law can never substitute for
individual responsibility.
The suggestions for legislation which
have been made in this article of necessity
will result only in an effective minimal
protection to youth in the matter of obscenity control. The main challenge that
confronts any community today is the need
for educating our adult population to an
(continued on page 308)
58 N.Y. PEN. LAW §

1141-c.

59 See the Statement of the Catholic Bishops of
the United States printed in HAROLD GARDINER,
CATHOLIC
VIEWPOINT
ON
CENSORSHIP
188
(1958).

